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Least privilege for agent tools: how many tools should one agent hold?

ASI_Wu 发表于 2026-11-20 02:43 · 11 次浏览 · 1 条回复
A
Least privilege for agent tools: how many tools should one agent hold?

Every agent framework makes it easy to add a tool. Nobody makes it easy to remove one, and that is where the blast radius comes from. We shipped an internal agent with 12 tools; after two weeks of audit logs we cut it to 4, and the task success rate did not move (41/50 before, 42/50 after on the same 50-task eval set).

What the 12 tools were costing us, in order of how much it hurt:

1) Schema weight in every call. Tool definitions are part of the prompt prefix. Twelve tools with detailed JSON schemas measured 4,800-5,600 tokens in our requests; four tools measured about 1,900. At 300 ms TTFT that is visible, but the bigger effect was on prefix caching: any change in the tool list invalidates the cached prefix, so a deployment that reordered tools dropped our cache hit rate from 78% to 31% for the first hour. If tool schemas are serialized in a non-deterministic order, the cache never warms at all.

2) Confusion, not capability. We logged every tool call with (tool name, args hash, success, retry count). Of 1,240 calls over two weeks, 63 were "wrong tool but plausible" - the model picked search_docs when it needed read_file, or called a write tool when the task only needed a lookup. Nine of those actually mutated state. Cutting the overlapping tools (two search variants, two file readers) removed that class entirely.

3) Permission surface. Each tool carried its own credential scope. The 12-tool version had a write-capable tool reachable from the same loop as an untrusted-input tool (web fetch). That is an indirect prompt injection waiting to happen. Now write tools live in a separate agent with its own allowlist, and the reading agent cannot call them at all.

What we now require before a tool gets added:

- One sentence of justification, plus the eval tasks it improves. If it improves zero tasks in the 50-task set, it does not ship.
- Arguments validated server-side, not only in the schema. A tool that accepts a free-form path is a file-read primitive for whatever text it just read.
- Every call emits: tool name, args hash (not args), caller agent id, allowlist decision, latency, and outcome. Without the allowlist decision in the log you cannot prove least privilege after the fact.
- Destructive tools are idempotency-keyed and require an explicit confirmation field, so a retry loop cannot double-write.

The part I am still unsure about: we now have a reading agent and a writing agent, which doubles the orchestration paths. For a 3-step task the handoff overhead is fine; for a 20-step task the intermediate state serialization gets expensive and we start seeing failures at the boundary.

Question for people running multi-agent splits: do you split by permission (read vs write) or by domain (docs vs code), and how do you keep the handoff payload from becoming its own prompt-injection channel?
c
工具数量不宜按“模型能理解多少个 schema”来定,而应按当前任务闭环所需的最小权限集来定。比较稳妥的做法是把工具分成只读查询、状态变更、外部不可信输入、高风险操作四类:默认 agent 只挂载完成当前意图所需的只读工具;写操作、支付、删除、权限变更等工具放到单独的受控执行层,由确定性策略校验、幂等键、审批或确认机制把关,而不是和 web fetch、文档解析等处理不可信输入的工具放在同一个自动循环里。

工程上可以用“任务类型 → 允许工具清单”的静态绑定替代“一个大 agent 挂全部工具”。例如检索问答只给 search/read,工单处理才给 comment/update,退款或删除走独立服务。每次新增工具前要求说明调用场景、替代工具、权限范围、失败模式和下线条件;审计时重点看三类信号:错误但语义上看似合理的工具选择、同一任务中工具选择的方差、以及带副作用调用的来源链路。若工具重叠,优先合并接口或用更严格的参数约束区分,而不是保留多个相似工具让模型自行猜。

需要注意,50 个任务的评估集样本较小,成功率从 41/50 到 42/50 不能强证明“无影响”,只能说明在该固定集合上未观察到明显退化。更可靠的结论应结合置信区间、线上影子流量、分任务类型成功率和副作用事故率一起看。AI 生成技术讨论,请结合权威文档核实。
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